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Precarious technoscapes: forced mobility and 
mobile connections at the urban margins
Peter Chonka and Jutta Bakonyi
Abstract: Displaced people settling at the margins of Somali cities live in conditions of extreme precarity. 
They are also active users of information and communications technology (ICTs), employing mobile 
phones to maintain social networks, obtain information, navigate urban space and labour markets, trans-
fer and store money, and receive aid. This article explores mobile connectivity from the perspective of 
displaced people, analysing how they experience mobile phones, and the connections they enable in the 
context of conflict and urban reconstruction in Somalia. The findings caution against techno-optimist 
developmental discourses, and provide a nuanced picture of the benefits, constraints, challenges and risks 
entailed in the engagement of marginalised urban populations with ICTs. Although providing various 
beneficial affordances, increased mobile connectivity does not by itself  diminish inequalities. ICTs can 
reinforce power differentials between urban labourers and employers, become instruments of exploita-
tion, and increase the distance between receivers of aid and the transnational regimes that govern pre-
carity in Somali cities.
Keywords: Mobile phones, mobile money, ICT4D, precarity, displacement, migration, urbanisation, 
Somalia, Africa.
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Introduction
Urbanisation in Somalia is closely related to displacement and migration.1 Violent 
conflicts and periodic ecological shocks displace people who often move to cities. 
There they either settle in makeshift dwellings in ruined buildings, build shacks on 
unused inner-city spaces or set up tents in sprawling camps that ring the outskirts 
of urban centres. While moving and settling, displaced people learn to navigate the 
uncertainties and insecurities of unfamiliar urban environments, mobilise new and 
existing social relations, engage with humanitarian organisations, and look for means 
to survive within urban labour markets. Their acute precarity is reflected and com-
pounded in their meagre possessions and basic shelter: corrugated steel huts, or tents 
constructed from sticks, tarpaulin, discarded cloth or tin cans. In the new urban settle-
ments, people often go without adequate food and lack sufficient access to healthcare 
or education. Basic mobile phones, however, are widely used by people in precarious 
settlements—in Somalia and across the wider continent—and constitute an increas-
ingly ubiquitous information and communications technology (ICT) integral to their 
sense-making, security and survival.
Mobile connectivity has become a prominent feature of social and economic life 
in Somali cities. The Somali telecommunications sector has been one of the most 
expansive industries post-1991, a period characterised by state collapse, conflict, for-
eign military intervention, and externally backed counterinsurgency and state-build-
ing efforts. In this article, we ask how displaced people use mobile phones and how 
engagement with ICT infrastructure shapes their everyday life in the urban envi-
ronment. Improving ICT access for marginalised mobile populations is an often-
stated goal of international development actors, and is frequently associated with 
narratives of ‘empowerment’ (Hatayama 2018; World Bank 2016). In the wake of 
the so-called ‘European Refugee Crisis’ of 2015–2016, the figure of the ‘connected 
migrant’ (Diminescu 2008) has risen in prominence. Accounts of digitally mediated 
mobility have highlighted the practical value of ICTs as they expand networking abil-
ities of mobile populations, increasing access to information and other resources that 
facilitate movement (UNHCR 2016). Increasingly, however, critical interventions are 
challenging this tech-optimism, highlighting individualised harms and burdens of 
connectivity (Awad & Tossell 2019), the techno-colonial power inequalities built into 
1 Research for this article was made possible by an ESRC/DFID (ES/R002355/1) research grant, and for 
Jutta Bakonyi additionally by a research fellowship provided by the Leverhulme Trust (RF-2018-642). 
We would like to thank our colleagues Abdirahman Edle and Kirsti Stuvøy, with whom we organised 
the research project. Thanks also to the Somali researchers who did an exceptional job in conducting 
narrative interviews: Mohamed Abdiqadir Botan (Bosaso), Ahmed Takow Hassan and Mahad Wasuge 
(Mogadishu), and Ismail Abdullahi Moalim (Baidoa). Assistance with the photovoice sessions was pro-
vided in Bosaso by Mohamed Yusuf Salah.
Precarious technoscapes: forced mobility and mobile connections at the urban margins 69
‘digital innovation for development’ discourse and practice (Madianou 2019), and the 
implication of ICTs in ‘post-humanitarian’ strategies for reproducing and governing 
an expanding global precariat (Duffield 2018).
Academic literature on migrants’ use of ICTs tends to focus on refugees en route to 
the Global North. Although studies of the impacts of ICTs for marginal populations 
in the Global South are increasing, research on the use of phones by forced migrants 
on the African continent is limited. This article’s empirical material was generated in 
a research project that explored links between urbanisation and displacement2 from 
the perspectives of displaced people in three cities in Somalia: Baidoa, Bosaaso and 
Mogadishu.3 It draws from 79 narrative interviews—conducted by researchers from 
Somalia and the authors between 2017 and 2018—with residents of multiple urban 
settlements in which predominantly displaced people reside. Thirteen semi-structured 
interviews were also held in those cities with so-called ‘gatekeepers’, host communities, 
humanitarian workers and local government officials. Additionally, the researchers 
used ‘photovoice’, equipping 30 people, ten in each city, with camera-phones to docu-
ment their everyday lives.4 Photos used in this article were taken by these research par-
ticipants. Drawing on research findings on migration to Europe, the interviews included 
questions on access to mobile phones and ICT infrastructure during displacement and 
resettlement. The interviewees confirmed widespread use and highlighted the everyday 
Figure 1. A female resident of a displaced people’s camp in Mogadishu holds her baby and phone. Photo 
by Mano (July 2018).
2 https://securityonthemove.co.uk/
3 Displaced people make up a significant proportion of the populations of these cities. The project also 
conducted research in Hargeisa, capital of the de facto independent but internationally unrecognised 
Republic of Somaliland (Stuvøy et al. 2021).
4 The photographic materials and testimonies were used in exhibitions aimed at stimulating dialogue 
between local policymakers and people living at the urban margins. An online version of the exhibition 
is available at: https://securityonthemove.co.uk/photo-exhibition/. Pseudonyms are used for interviewees; 
photographers are mentioned by their first name.
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affordances of mobile phones for maintaining social networks within cities, and with 
rural places of origin. Mobile phones also enabled payments for work and facilitated 
engagement with humanitarian actors using mobile money systems for cash aid.
Drawing from Appadurai, we use the concept of ‘technoscapes’ to emphasise the 
‘global configuration ... of technology’ that ‘moves at high speeds across various kinds 
of previously impervious boundaries’ (1990: 34). Appadurai’s emphasis on mobility, 
flows and ‘scapes’ aims at overcoming the often static and spatially bounded conceptu-
alisation of the social. Instead, he highlights how multiple, multidirectional and chaotic 
flows crisscross the globe, creating overlaps and intersections that shape contemporary 
global culture. To underscore his argument, Appadurai tends to contrast flows with 
(spatial) fixities and implicitly dissolves the dialectic tension between mobility and geo-
graphic spatiality that other researchers have identified as constitutive of socio-spatial 
formations (Thrift 2006). His emphasis on flows, therefore, runs the risk of overlooking 
how multiple mobilities are embedded in—and simultaneously shape—a variety of 
locally specific social relations and materialise unequally in socio-spatial formations 
and landscapes across the globe (Heyman & Campbell 2009). We build on Appadurai’s 
notion of technoscapes, emphasising the planetary expansion of digital technologies. 
However, beyond the notion of unfettered movement, our focus on the everyday lives 
of people at urban margins shows how flows are staggered and interrupted as they are 
embedded in improvised and cobbled-together materials that constitute the precarious 
fringes of global technoscapes. Precarity here identifies politically-induced conditions 
of existential and normalised uncertainty and insecurity for certain populations (Butler 
2009: ii). People undertake continuous improvisation, making their living through 
assembling left-over materials and social fragments, and mitigating infrastructural gaps 
and technological deficiencies with their bodies and labour (Simone 2018; McFarlane 
2018). Our articulation of precarious technoscapes enables us to identify how margin-
alised urban populations engage with and understand ICTs, without detaching these 
local, specific uses of technology—and the particular socio-spatial relations in which 
they take place—from the wider flows that enable and shape them. It is through this 
everyday lens that transnational flows and the multi-scalar entanglement of people 
living at the margins of Somali cities become visible.
Elsewhere, we have identified entanglements of locally distinctive and globally trav-
elling practices governing displaced populations and have discussed people’s agency to 
comply with or resist these modalities of government. The role of international human-
itarian regimes and (diasporic) capital investment makes the reconstruction of (post)
conflict Somali cities and the commodification and regulation of property relations 
inherently transnational (Bakonyi et al. 2019; Bakonyi 2021). In this article, we use the 
example of mobile phones, as individual devices and related infrastructure, as a further 
example of (global) interconnectedness. Urban ICTs play a distinctive role in forging 
multiple connections: between displaced people, the Somali diaspora, urban investors 
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and employers, international telecommunications companies, humanitarian agencies, 
and national and international policymakers. We examine how people who live in acute 
precarity make use of mobile phones and engage with these networks. Exploring multi-
ple and diverse encounters through the lens of ICT infrastructure and its usage demon-
strates how these particulars are embedded in wider networks and flows. This is more 
illuminating of conditions and practices of urban precarity than focusing simply on the 
‘effects’ of technologies on particular groups (Brinkman et al. 2017).
The article proceeds with a review of literature on the relations between connec-
tivity and (forced) mobility. We point to the paucity of empirical engagement on these 
questions within cities in the Global South and discuss growing scepticism about the 
‘empowering’ potential of connectivity. This is followed by an introduction of the 
dynamics of displacement and (post)conflict urbanisation in Somalia. Here we also 
discuss the emergence of telecommunication companies as powerful actors within the 
conditions of a (formally) unregulated economy. We then discuss how connectivity 
is experienced by people with limited literacy, but who are compelled to engage with 
mobile systems. We examine how people imagined the affordances of technology (Nagy 
& Neff 2015), the things they felt that they could do with mobiles to address their con-
ditions of insecurity caused by displacement. However, their accounts also brought 
to light various risks or insecurities associated with the social and economic relations 
mediated through mobile connections. We focus on relations between employers and 
a displaced workforce, and how mobile phone/money use reflects and reinforces spa-
tial urban divides, power imbalances, and differing levels of digital capability. We 
also highlight risks associated with digital humanitarian engagement, data collection 
and connectivity into extortive global migration networks. Mobile infrastructure is 
embedded in the social fabric of urban life and implicated in the political economies 
of displacement, aid and labour that underpin the (post)conflict reconstruction of 
Somali cities. A comprehensive account of these interconnections is required for any 
assessment of the extent to which the lives of people at the margins are improved by 
ICT access.
Mobile phones and mobile people: displacement, empowerment and 
precarity
The acceleration of migration flows through Mediterranean routes around 2015 
prompted significant research interest in the role of phones and mobile internet access 
for people making perilous journeys into ‘fortress Europe’. A burgeoning literature 
explores how mobile connectivity helps migrants access practical journey-relevant 
information, navigate border regimes, access or avoid human trafficking/smuggling 
networks, connect with humanitarian actors, and obtain digital resources on arrival 
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that may foster social integration (Borkert et  al. 2018; Dekker & Engbersen 2014; 
Frouws et al. 2016; Gillespie et al. 2018). This builds on earlier research on phones as 
the ‘social glue’ of migrant transnationalism (Vertovec 2004) and the emergence of 
‘digital diasporas’ in the internet age (Brinkerhoff 2009). ICTs have long contributed 
to the deepening and broadening of transnational social networks and influenced fur-
ther migration (Charmarkeh 2013; Diminescu 2008; Horst, C. 2006; Hiller & Franz 
2004; Komito 2011; Lindley 2009b; Madianou 2016; Oiarzabal & Reips 2012; Schaub 
2012). Studies in these fields have focused mainly on international migration and jour-
neys to Europe, while migration within the Global South has gained less attention. 
Research on displaced peoples’ ICT use in African contexts is limited, although recent 
studies on camps in Kenya and Uganda have shown significant smartphone use and 
a higher than the national average smartphone ownership (Hounsell & Owuor 2018).
Recent studies have critiqued utilitarian interpretations that emphasise the trans-
formative or empowering aspects of ICT access. Awad & Tossell (2019) detail the 
emotional strain that post-arrival migrants face in their use of social media to main-
tain connections with a conflict-affected homeland. Connectivity builds expecta-
tions among family members that arrivals in Europe will always be ‘on-call’ to fulfil 
long-distance obligations. Digital connections can also enable mobility-linked extor-
tion and studies have highlighted how phones, digital images and videos are used by 
groups who detain and torture migrants in transit countries for ransom payments 
from distant family members (Van Esseveld 2019; MacGregor 2019). This is a phe-
nomenon we discuss below.
Studies of phone use by people moving within countries of the Global South have 
asked whether increased connectivity accelerates rural-to-urban migration (Muto 
2012; Onitsuka & Hidayat 2019). Given the multiplicity of factors that drive migra-
tion to cities, differentiation of causes and effects of urban in-migration is difficult. 
Migration may be driven by economic growth and employment ‘pull’ factors, which 
can themselves contribute to greater ICT diffusion and expand markets for migrant 
connectivity (Cartier et  al. 2005; Hübler 2016). Ethnographic research on mobile 
phone use and mobility within the Global South has emphasised the impacts of ICTs 
on social networks and their contribution to the continued entanglement of rural and 
urban economies and livelihood-related movements. Steel et al. (2017: 148) describe 
how ICT use in Cameroon, Rwanda and Sudan ‘facilitated new connections and 
decreased the physical and psychological distance between the city and the country-
side’. They situate this within historical continuities of mobility, identified as a crucial 
element of the livelihoods across multiple African contexts (Steel et al. 2017: 153; De 
Bruijn et al. 2010).
Nonetheless, communication practices of migrants moving to and within cit-
ies have received little attention. Very few studies engage with the use of ICTs by 
internally displaced populations and those living in conditions of acute ecological, 
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economic or social precarity. Boas (2020) looks at the online social networking of 
people displaced by climate change-related environmental shocks in Bangladesh, 
and emphasises the complexity and multi-directionality of movement. Here, mobile 
phones enable migrants to maintain extended and dispersed social ties, which can be 
leveraged when necessary. Boas (2020: 1330) argues that phones allowed for the coor-
dinated utilisation of geographically expanded networks, improved mobility decision 
making and reduced risks. Phone/online access allows micro-coordination of move-
ments during emergencies, makes information available and thus supports displaced 
people’s decision making.
Considering mobilities related to everyday livelihoods, research in the ‘ICT for 
development’ (ICT4D) field has explored gender dynamics and potentials for women’s 
empowerment through improved access to mobile communications. Studies highlight 
how devices ease access to market-relevant information or increase entrepreneurial 
capacity (Komunte 2015; Kusimba et al. 2015; Suri & Jack 2016). However, scepticism 
about the liberating promises of technology grows. Research has shown, for example, 
how cultural and economic factors can reinforce patriarchal power in the ways phones 
are accessed and used (Wallis 2011). ICTs may facilitate long-distance links vital for 
accessing opportunities, such as those described in Dahya & Dryden-Peterson’s (2017) 
study of Somali refugees’ use of virtual support networks to (potentially) access higher 
education. However, as they and others note, mobile connectivity does not automat-
ically transform or transcend social structures, and ICTs are more often used in ways 
that support existing structural and agentic constraints on gender equality, reinforce 
existing social power dynamics and strengthen patriarchal familial bonds (Hahn & 
Kibora 2008; Horst, H.A. 2006). Porter et al. (2020) provide a comparative account 
of relationships between young women’s phone ownership and usage, their relative 
empowerment, and chronic poverty in Ghana, Malawi and South Africa. Women’s 
use of phones is often embedded in new forms of surveillance and control by male 
family members and partners. Phones can increase the threat of sexual harassment by 
powerful others, which can negatively impact educational and entrepreneurial strat-
egies. While the authors acknowledge that ‘many women now perceive the phone as 
an essential tool for promoting work opportunities’, they also emphasise the lack of 
evidence that phone use has had a positive impact or removed restrictions in contexts 
of ‘intense competition for jobs and business opportunities among women with few 
skills and little capital’ (Porter et al. 2020: 188).
Recognition of patriarchal and economic constraints to technologically medi-
ated empowerment has not dampened international humanitarian and development 
organisations’ enthusiasm for ICT-orientated interventions, and programming often 
engages narratives around the entrepreneurial capacity of impoverished populations. 
Projects frequently attempt to leverage potential benefits to livelihoods and educa-
tion opportunities that ICTs can provide (Hatayama, 2018) and feed into currently 
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dominant ‘resilience’ discourses (Chandler 2014). The neoliberal underpinnings of 
such programming have been widely critiqued, partly because the promotion of 
self-reliance and self-care shifts welfare responsibilities onto refugees themselves 
(Skran & Easton-Calabria 2020). For Duffield (2018: 142), the emphasis on innova-
tive and design-based responses to poverty forms part of a global ‘post-humanitarian’ 
shift away from structural social transformations to the acceptance of an inequitable 
global status quo. This acceptance is enacted through ‘disaggregated biopolitical tech-
nologies’, including the use of mobile telephony, a platformised ‘gig economy’, and 
the digital facilitation of humanitarian management from a distance.
These research contexts and questions are relevant to our discussion of mobile 
phone use, displacement and urbanisation in Somalia, a country historically char-
acterised by high levels of mobility and extensive, often securitised (and militarised) 
humanitarian engagement. A large part of the Somali population is directly or indi-
rectly dependent on nomadic pastoralism or agro-pastoralism, and climate-induced 
migration increasingly intersects with waves of mass displacement that accompany 
recurrent conflict. Mobility is multidirectional. People on the move build on wide 
social networks and mobilise complex social relations that stretch across kin groups 
and urban and rural locations. Acknowledgement of the multi-directionality, multi-
plicity and complexity of migration is a starting point for analysis of precarious tech-
noscapes. We focus here on the role of ICTs in establishing, maintaining or changing 
these networks, and how they are activated and used when needed. Studies on mobile 
phone connectivity within dynamics of displacement, (re-)settlement and urbanisa-
tion in Somalia or the wider Horn of Africa are lacking, and we know little about the 
way ICTs affect living conditions in sprawling camp-like settlements that exist within 
and around many cities. How do displaced people use mobile phones? Do phones 
shape how they navigate the new urban environment, establish settlements or look 
for new livelihoods? How are survival strategies involving mobile phones gendered? 
Before turning to accounts from displaced people that begin to answer these ques-
tions, we provide in the next section a brief  background to the recurrent conflict and 
ongoing urban reconstruction in Somalia, and outline the rise and role of the modern 
telecommunications sector.
Displacement, urban (re)construction and connectivity in Somalia
The cities of Mogadishu, Baidoa and Bosaaso have each been affected in different 
ways by violent conflicts and corresponding phases of destruction, displacement, 
resettlement and (re)construction. Somalia’s central government collapsed in 1991. 
The clan-based factions that ousted the longstanding military regime failed to form 
a new government, fragmenting in subsequent phases of violence that increasingly 
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came to be organised along clan lines (Kapteijns 2012). Consequently, many peo-
ple migrated from previously more diverse cities to territories dominated by their 
clan (Hoehne 2016). Physical institutions and symbols of the state were destroyed 
in Mogadishu, along with much of the city’s wider infrastructure. Militias fought 
over southern regions, grabbing valuable agricultural land and humanitarian sup-
plies flowing into the country. The violence accelerated the effects of drought and 
initiated a famine, within which the agriculturally productive Bay region and its main 
city Baidoa became an epicentre (de Waal 1997: 164–8). Bosaaso, a port city on the 
north-eastern Somali coast, was largely spared from violence and became an attrac-
tive destination for people violently displaced from elsewhere, including officials and 
businesspeople linked with the former regime, as well as southern ‘minority’ clan/
ethnic groups (Marchal 2010).
By the mid-1990s, and following the withdrawal of the failed UN humanitarian 
intervention (1992–95), mass violence subsided. Unable to re-establish a central gov-
ernment, clan-based militias divided Somalia into a patchwork of fiefdoms (Bakonyi 
2013). Some governance experiments became lasting political projects—such as the 
north-eastern autonomous Puntland State, with Bosaaso as its commercial centre. 
In the early 2000s, a Union of Islamic Courts formed in the southern regions as a 
relatively broad-based and popularly-supported authority (Ahmad 2015; Barnes & 
Hassan 2007). Neighbouring Ethiopia (backed by the US) understood the Courts 
as a security threat and invaded the country in 2006. The Courts were overthrown, 
but Al Shabaab emerged from their ruins. The group consolidated its power across 
the southern regions, including Mogadishu and Baidoa, until the African Union 
Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) helped the Transitional Federal Government oust it 
from the capital in 2011. This fighting caused mass displacement out of Mogadishu. 
However, Al Shabaab’s withdrawal from the capital coincided with a severe famine 
which, during 2011, precipitated a new influx of people into Mogadishu and Baidoa. 
These cities promised access to humanitarian aid with the presence of AMISOM and 
other international actors. Despite losing direct control of most of its former urban 
strongholds since 2011, Al Shabaab maintains its insurgency in rural areas and reg-
ularly launches attacks in the Somali capital. Nonetheless, the absence of large-scale 
urban violence has initiated investments in business and real estate, often driven by 
the diaspora. Displaced people play a role in urban reconstruction as they provide a 
large pool of cheap labour. They often clear and prepare land for settlements, which 
can increase its value. Owners may then return and evict displaced people to sell or 
commercially develop these plots (Bakonyi et al. 2019: 88).
In the context of statelessness, and despite recurrent phases of violence, a vibrant 
and expanding telecommunications market has evolved in Somalia. Throughout the 
1990s, multiple mobile phone and internet providers imported telecommunication 
infrastructures and established their services across the fragmented political space 
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(Collins 2009; Feldman 2007; Nurhussein 2008). High competition drove down air-
time costs while coping with a largely unregulated and (concerning business transac-
tions and property rights) formally unprotected environment,5 required innovation 
from providers.
This could be seen, for instance, in the development of  SMS-based mobile money 
systems that are now prevalent across the Somali territories. Telesom, the leading 
mobile provider in Somaliland, launched its Zaad mobile money service in 2009 
(Iazzolino 2015). This was emulated by telecommunication companies in southern 
Somalia and Puntland. Cash can be deposited into users’ mobile accounts and the 
input of  SMS-based codes on even basic phones—indicating the desired function, 
amount, the phone number of  recipient and a security PIN—enables the transfer 
of  balances. SMS notifications inform users that money has been sent or received, 
and provide account balances. The systems effectively operate as saving accounts 
and are used to send and receive money. Like Safaricom’s renowned MPesa sys-
tem in Kenya, Somali SMS mobile money systems do not require mobile internet, 
but unlike MPesa, they have hitherto not charged transfer fees. In Somalia, mobile 
money is calculated in US Dollars, as the devalued local currency is not easily trans-
portable across the fragmented territories and printed banknotes have diminished 
(Figure 2).6 These factors, alongside the proliferation of  cheap mobile handsets, have 
led to the widespread uptake of  mobile money. As the accounts below demonstrate, 
people use mobile money services for their everyday shopping, receipt of  wages and 
humanitarian support, and money transfers within social networks. Even beggars 
often hold signs with their mobile numbers as passers-by aren’t likely to have small 
(physical) cash.
Telecommunications companies play a central economic role throughout Somalia 
and have emerged as powerful business actors. These companies overlap with the 
foreign remittance industry and nascent formal banking sector, and hold investment 
portfolios in agricultural land, food production and trade. Emblematic of their status 
in narratives of economic growth, their physical corporate headquarters are rising 
in size and visibility on the skyline of cities such as Mogadishu. Hormuud is the 
dominant telecom provider in southern Somalia—with Golis and Telesom leading 
in the Puntland and Somaliland markets, respectively. These companies emerged 
5 Properties are not entirely unprotected in Somalia. Multiple property and user rights are embedded 
in informal regulations and customary laws that are, however, constantly negotiated and often also vio-
lently contested. They are also not uniformly applied and change in accordance with the groups able to 
exert dominance.
6 In spite of the collapse of the state, and with it the national bank, the Somali Shilling (SoSh) continued 
to be used, alongside US Dollars for larger transactions. Over the years, several politico-military leaders 
printed new banknotes, initiating severe inflation of the SoSh (Luther 2012). In recent years, the printing 
of ‘forged’ banknotes has ceased and the availability of SoSh has significantly reduced.
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around 2002 and grew out of earlier infrastructure developed by the Al Barakaat 
remittance company (Hagmann & Stepputat 2016: 10; Lochery 2015; Marchal 2002). 
Al Barakaat operated until 2001 when its funds were frozen by the US following accu-
sations of links to terrorist financing (Lindley 2009a: 529). Today, Hormuud offers a 
wide range of services and is a provider of some of the lowest-cost mobile internet 
data in the world. In this context, mobile telephony provides a nearly ideal-typical 
example of the global flows that Appadurai’s concept of technoscapes emphasises. 
Although internet access via smartphones is beyond the reach of the majority of 
people living at the margins of cities, basic mobile phones and mobile money were 
used by all interviewees. Only four interviewees, all of them elderly, did not possess a 
phone. However, they still used the devices of relatives or neighbours to communicate 
or receive money. Some interviewees reported that they had not had a phone for some 
time because it was broken, had been stolen or they had to sell it. They usually tried 
to replace it as soon as possible.
Figure 2. Children in a resettlement area for displaced people in Bosaaso play with ‘worthless’ paper 
currency printed by a previous administration. Photo by Nuurow (July 2018).
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Hormuud has become a leading actor in the political economy of Somalia. The 
expansion of mobile telephony has precipitated a shift by humanitarian actors towards 
mobile money cash assistance, further expanding mobile phone use by displaced peo-
ple. Jaspars et al. (2019) outline the wide-ranging impacts of this development, not 
only at the micro level of vulnerable populations’ access to aid but also concerning 
the broader entanglements of humanitarian assistance, business and conflict. Major 
international aid organisations give out SIM cards or phones to displaced people and 
these are used at registered retailers to buy essential items, often alongside biomet-
ric ID and e-voucher systems. This requires large-scale close cooperation between 
humanitarian actors and telecom companies. Around 90 per cent of cash aid trans-
fers in Somalia flow through Hormuud, which takes fees from humanitarian mobile 
transfers and supplies equipment for aid organisations (Jaspars et al. 2019: 18). The 
company arguably wields more power than the Somali Federal Government. It invests 
heavily in food imports and rural land for export-orientated agriculture, contributing 
to a decline in local food production, rising rural land prices and subsequent dis-
placements of farming populations, particularly from weaker or so-called minority 
clans (Jaspars et al. 2019: 25, 44). This occurs in rural hinterlands still affected by Al 
Shabaab’s influence and militancy, itself  playing a role in driving forced displacement. 
Jaspars et al. (2019: 34) point out corruption in the cash aid system and the lack of 
attention paid by humanitarian actors to the wider political economy of assistance. 
At the micro level, displaced people often make payments to gatekeepers involved in 
the creation and management of their settlements. While gatekeepers provide sup-
port to new arrivals, they also extract a share of aid when camps become big enough 
to attract the attention of humanitarian organisations (Bakonyi 2021). We return to 
these practices below.
The fact that telecommunications companies have become key players in the 
complex political economy of  humanitarianism illustrates how the impact of  ICT 
diffusion cannot be conceptualised solely through a micro-level focus on individual 
device use. Similarly, Brinkman et al. (2017) analyse South Sudan’s mobile phone 
industry and infrastructure, emphasising the embeddedness of  the sector in the 
political economy of  mobility, displacement and speculation around emerging ICT 
markets. Nonetheless, micro-level data on the ICT use of  the urban poor is lack-
ing. Addressing this, the following section shows how mobile phone-use condi-
tions urban mobilities and precarious livelihoods at the margins of  rapidly growing 
Somali cities. It also connects people—in ambiguous ways—to the transnational 
humanitarian and commercial networks that underpin their contemporary recon-
struction. Here, mobile telephony, in spite of  its ability to collapse spatial and 
temporal distances, contributes to the establishment of  socio-spatial and infra-
structural formations located at the precarious edges of  both growing cities and 
global technoscapes.
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Navigating precarity in Somali cities: mobile affordances
Most of the people interviewed during the research had been displaced from rural areas. 
Some had moved only a few months prior to interview; others had been displaced in 
earlier periods of violence and had lived in the cities for nearly two decades. All lived in 
settlements that were, in popular parlance, referred to as camps or neighbourhoods of 
‘the displaced’ (barakacayaasha).7 People frequently described a combination of differ-
ent factors causing their displacement, including armed conflict, ecological shocks such 
as droughts or floods, or high levels of taxation by Al Shabaab. Many referred to the loss 
of their livelihoods and poor economic prospects in rural areas. Distinctions between 
‘forced’ internal displacement and ‘economic’ rural–urban migration, or between peo-
ple who cross state borders (refugees, returnees) and those who move within the same 
country, can obscure the social complexity of displacement and urbanisation in a region 
where state boundaries are regularly crossed by nomadic pastoralists, traders and dis-
placed people. People categorised as refugees, returnees or internally displaced people 
by international organisations often lived side-by-side with other poor urban dwellers, 
who could not afford rising rent prices in the rapidly growing cities. This section anal-
yses how interviewees who were residing in settlements associated with displacement 
(camps) used mobile phones in the course their displacement, and perceived and expe-
rienced mobile connectivity in the context of precarity. Despite living in conditions of 
acute poverty, a large majority of interviewees reported owning a basic mobile phone, 
often a Techno or Nokia model, and had experience using mobile money. Many people 
had not purchased their phone but received the device from a family member, a human-
itarian organisation or an employer. As in other African contexts, mobile sharing is 
common in families and among neighbours, so even when ownership is lacking this 
does not necessarily mean absence of use (Hahn & Kibora 2008).
The importance of mobile telephony is reflected in the morphology of urban 
camps. Signboards with mobile telephone numbers are spread throughout clusters of 
camps at the cities’ outskirts, as well as in camps located in the inner city. The sign-
boards (Figure 3) display the telephone numbers of camp leaders (so-called gatekeep-
ers) who organise and manage these settlements. Gatekeepers in Mogadishu often 
hailed from clan families of people who own the land on which displaced people 
settle. A  large proportion of displaced people come from either Rahanweyn (Digil 
& Mirifle) clans or belong to other, often racialised, minority groups such as the so 
called ‘Jareer’/’Somali Bantu’ (Kusow & Eno 2015). They therefore need a broker to 
negotiate settlement with landowners and ensure the protection of the camp through 
that clan.
7 Status designations are often territorialised (Wacquant et al. 2014). The status of displaced people in 
cities in Somalia is linked with both the place of settlement and the clan affiliation of the settler (Bakonyi 
& Chonka forthcoming).
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Interviewees also explained how they use the phone to inform incoming relatives 
and friends about places to settle. People who had decided to move to the urban 
camps had often communicated before with relatives and neighbours who had already 
made the journey. These contacts helped them find a place where they could obtain 
the necessary support until they learned how to navigate the city. Most displaced 
people try to find camps where aid is available or expected. Many interviewees out-
lined how mobile phones enabled them to stay in contact with family members who 
remained in rural areas. People spoke frequently with their relatives to receive updates 
on their wellbeing and ‘the family situation’ (Gedi, Baidoa, 3 January 2018). They 
received political and security updates, or ‘whether they received rain or not’ (Olad, 
Baidoa, 3 January 2018). Several interviewees appreciated how the phone removed the 
Figure 3. Baidoa camp sign. Photo by Ahmed (July 2018).
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need for them to travel back to the rural areas for information. Ikran compared a lack 
of access to a phone to being ‘like a deaf person’ (Bosasso, 23 December 2017). Aliya, 
a 30-year-old woman who had lived in Mogadishu for 7 years after leaving the south-
western Bakool region, explained the difference between the present and displacement 
in an earlier period when fewer people had mobile phones. In an earlier experience of 
displacement, she lost contact with the aunt who had raised her and could only obtain 
second-hand information about her wellbeing:
There were no mobile phones at that time. So she [aunt] did not know whether I was alive then. 
I met her a few years back when I had already become a [older] woman. [In the meantime] 
I have been working for families for free, in return for living with them. [At that time] I met with 
people who fled from that place and they told me about my aunt. (9 January 2018)
Shamsa, who fled to Mogadishu in 2014—after a drought hit her region and Al 
Shabaab blocked humanitarian aid—explained the challenges of being unable to 
communicate with loved ones:
[When I fled] I couldn’t communicate with anyone because I did not have a mobile phone with 
me, you understand? And I did not have their contacts with me. So, I didn’t know their situation 
... I can’t even speak with my siblings ... I am worried. (9 January 2018)
Displaced people in Baidoa emphasised difficulties in getting in contact with family 
members as Al Shabaab disrupts communication networks. According to a camp resi-
dent in Baidoa, the Islamist militia suspects that people ‘are communicating with their 
enemies’ and providing them with information on the areas they control and therefore 
‘end up destroying the antennae [telephone masts]’. When they can make calls, their 
family members ‘talk in fear’ of repercussions by Al Shabaab and the conditions of 
insecurity they endure (Robla, Baidoa, 3 January 2018). Al Shabaab has also enforced 
bans on the use of mobile internet on smartphones in areas which it controls (RSF/
Reporters Without Borders 2014).
Many displaced people rely on financial and other assistance from neighbours, 
relatives and friends, and phones facilitate searching for and requesting support. As 
Eney explained:
I benefit [from the phone], for example, when I wanted something from someone, I used to go to 
him or her. But now, I just call them while I am at home. If I don’t have something for my family 
to eat, [you call and say] ‘if you have worked today and you made some money, please bring me 
something ...’ Yeah, he will send me 5 dollars or 2 dollars. So, I benefit from not having to walk 
in the sun. (Baidoa, 2 January 2018)
Eney confirms how mobile telephony transforms experiences of space and time. It 
allows people to communicate and to mobilise support without the need to move 
physically and contributes to dissolving oppositions of nearness and remoteness, 
mobility and fixity, presence and absence (Urry 2007: 180–1). Interviewees particu-
larly appreciated the use of the phone for sending and receiving money: ‘I really thank 
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God for providing us such kind of services’ (Gedi, Baidoa, 3 January 2018). As Gedi 
puts it, the phone replaced the wallet, and interviewees described how they pay for 
their shopping in town or receive money for services provided to others. Underscoring 
the hand-to-mouth nature of their economic precarity, Shoobta noted that if  her hus-
band was late from work, he would still be able to send money to the family so that the 
children would not have to go to bed hungry (Mogadishu, 9 January 2018).
Others outlined how mobile money facilitated their settlement in urban camps, as 
they could instruct relatives to sell the few belongings they had left back home. Megaag, 
for example, still had livestock and requested his brothers to sell his animals and send 
the money to pay for his settlement in an urban camp (Baidoa, 4 January 2018). Idow 
in Baidoa emphasised a similar affordance, but referred to security on the move:
It helped me a lot. You know, when you are a traveller and you look after animals you just 
deposit money into the EVC service because you might encounter thieves on the way. Carrying 
cash is riskier ... So, when your money is in the EVC service, no one can take it from you. Maybe 
someone can take your life, but can you take [money from] a sim card? No one can. (1 January 
2018)
However, phones are a common target of armed robbers, and many participants noted 
fears and experiences of violent crime. Deynabo, a woman in Mogadishu, described 
how she had been robbed:
There are some thieves around some of the places where I work. One day, as I was walking from 
work, they attacked me with a knife. They robbed me of my cell phone, and my money was within 
the phone. They also took a plastic bag of food from me. Immediately, I went to the [telephone] 
company and informed them that my mobile phone was stolen by thieves. And the money was 
returned. I was coming from work, it was late afternoon around 4pm. I was then without a phone 
for some months, but I later got another one. (8 January 2018)
Although other interviewees spoke about robbers’ use of violence to get hold of a 
victim’s PIN to access accounts, in most cases, people perceived mobile money to be 
more secure than carrying cash. In Deynabo’s case, her savings were available as soon 
as the phone company provided a new SIM and restored access to her account.
Without access to formal banking, interviewees outlined how mobile money 
(Sahal) functions like a savings account. Yasmin in Bosaaso explained that
if my husband brings 10 Dollars a day, we use 5 Dollars for things like rent and keep the other 5 
in Sahal .... The phone helps us to save the little money we get. (23 December 2017)
Mobile money accounts are often used in rotating group saving schemes, known as 
Ayuuto/Hagbad. Groups pool contributions from members, who take it in turn to 
receive the accumulated pot. This allows for the payment of debt or larger purchases.
Mobile phones have also become central to the ways in which displaced people 
navigate the urban environment in search of work. Women often provide laundry 
or cleaning services to wealthier households, while men characteristically look for 
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opportunities on construction sites. Although women continue to go door-to-door to 
offer domestic labour, they also leave their mobile numbers. This allows clients to call 
them when work is available, and the worker to call to inquire about work. Aasia in 
Mogadishu outlined that she only bought a phone to enable her client to call if  work 
was available. She also emphasised that a phone was needed to receive her payment as 
there is generally ‘not much [paper] cash circulating’ (8 January 2018). Dhahiro addi-
tionally explained how the phone facilitated work and ad hoc assistance from clients:
When there is work, [customers] check on me when they don’t see me around. They ask if I am 
sick, and they sometimes send me a dollar so that I can buy food for my kids. ... I might say that 
my daughter is hungry. They would say, I will send a dollar to this poor person or two dollars so 
I can buy milk for my children. Thank God. (Mogadishu, 7 January 2018)
The prevalence of mobile money enables humanitarian organisations to increasingly 
rely on these systems for cash aid. Some interviewees noted how displaced people 
had been biometrically registered and given SIM cards; some even received phones, 
through which they had received some support.
Precarious technoscapes: limits and risks of connectivity
The previous section indicates the extent to which mobile phones are embedded in 
the daily experiences, mobilities and livelihoods of some of the poorest and most 
vulnerable people in Somali cities. So far, the affordances of mobile phones have been 
described in terms of their perceived value and in ways which correspond with dom-
inant humanitarian narratives about the empowering utility of ICTs. In this section, 
however, we illustrate how social inequalities are reflected in displaced people’s ICT 
use, and the extent to which necessities to engage with mobile communications rein-
force their positions of precarity and marginality.
Urban displaced populations constitute a large pool of cheap and exploitable 
labour. As people in the camps usually do not hail from dominant clan groups in 
the cities, social and labour relations are stratified and unequal. In such contexts, 
technologies such as mobile money can be used in ways which disadvantage workers 
and reinforce spatial divides between the camps and city neighbourhoods where work-
ers and employers reside. Aasia, for example, reported three instances where people 
who employed her for domestic labour in Mogadishu promised to send payment by 
phone but then failed to do so (8 January 2018). Other women had similar experiences 
and were either paid less than the agreed amount or received nothing at all. Aalima 
explained how she had little chance of recovering the payment:
Sometimes they [the employers] say to us ‘give your number and we will send the money to you.’ 
Then, after a while, they send you less money than what you have worked for. This happened to 
me one day. I went shopping and when I reached the market, I collected what I needed and then 
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told the seller to withdraw his money from my phone. When he tried it, there was no money in 
my phone. Then I ran back to where I had worked. I told the sister [of my employer] ‘you sent 
me only a message – so give the money to me in cash.’ She said, ‘I already sent you the money. 
So if I have not sent you the money, why did you leave here?’ As we were quarrelling, some of 
the neighbours came and tried to calm the lady. But she insisted and forced me out of her house. 
One of the ladies assisted me with one thousand shillings [approx. 0.04USD] and advised me 
to leave. I left and went to the Telecom company. But they told me there was no money that was 
sent to the phone. Then I kept quiet and left. (8 January 2018).
With greater circulation of hard currency, it would be less likely that the women 
would leave their place of casual employment without receiving payment. The ability 
for employers to defer payment relies on the prevalence of mobile money for remote 
transfers. Other important factors are the employer’s physical detachment in a gated 
compound in a city neighbourhood; the employee’s subordinate position; displaced 
people’s related inability to leverage influential social networks in the city; and a lack 
of enforced labour laws.
Aalima’s description of her interaction with the shopkeeper—from whom she 
attempts to buy goods and thus discovers that she has not been paid—highlights 
another problem which compounds her disadvantaged position. She tells the vendor 
to withdraw the money from her phone for her, indicating that she is not comfortable 
or fully able to use the phone interface to send the money herself. Although the major-
ity of interviewees spoke about familiarity with mobile money systems, many also 
noted that they required assistance to use the technology. This was particularly true 
for older people and especially women, and was often related to weak literacy skills, 
hindering navigation of the text-based inputs and notifications (Wasuge 2019). In 
Aalima’s case, this reduced her ability to confirm whether the payment was received.
In other contexts, studies have reported difficulties with text-based phone inter-
faces as a factor hindering people’s use of digital financial tools and services (Wyche 
& Steinfield 2016). Differing levels of (digital) literacy are important here, as we heard 
about the widespread usage of services, albeit with simultaneous reliance on other 
people to assist with some functions. Nagan, a 30-year-old laundrywoman, explained 
that she is usually paid through the mobile. However, she also noted that she does not 
know how to fully operate the services:
I do not know how to use it. I go to [shops] and tell them to get the money out for me. ... I can 
tell how much I have left in my account. However, I do not know how to send money to others. 
I was taught how to check my account, but I could not understand how to send money well. (7 
January 2018)
Shamsa explained her device use in a similar way: ‘I ask the people I  trust to help 
me to send money to the people I owe money’ (Mogadishu, 9 January 2018). While 
mutual help is common in the settlements of displaced people, the inability to operate 
the transfer and banking services or even to check the amount of money received, 
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paid or left in the account diminishes people’s capacity to act independently and 
opens opportunities for control and abuse. Although none of the interviewees explic-
itly highlighted this risk, the accounts of exploitative labour relations discussed above 
are compounded by such digital inequalities.
Many interviewees treated mobile phones as part of their essential living expenses. 
Others, however, simply couldn’t afford to spend money on communication and only 
irregularly topped up their phones. As Dahabo explained:
I call my clients and ask if they have a job to be done. ... I spend a lot of money. The rate of call-
ing is too high. When you call the families and the clients asking if you can come for them, you 
must top-up each time. ... The amount I use [for topping-up] it is very high. Sometimes I miss a 
job and [I have to] take debt from neighbours. Or we sleep hungry for some nights. But if I get 
a job, that night my children will have a good night. (Mogadishu, 9 January 2018)
Many reported that they would put on the minimum required 10 cents of airtime, which 
would enable them to ‘flash’ people with a missed call, signalling a request for a call 
back. As most displaced people were not connected to electricity, they also pay to charge 
phones, even if this service costs only a few Somali Shillings from kiosks in/near camps.
Across Somalia, mobile phones play a role in the remittance sector, which facili-
tates huge inward financial flows from the global diaspora. Although remittances are 
vital for the wider Somali economy and household finances, displaced people from 
marginalised social groups are generally less likely to have these diasporic connections 
and regular access to financial remittances (Majid et al. 2018). Conversely, some inter-
viewees’ accounts of international and migration-linked networks highlighted dangers 
of transnational connectivity. For Murayo in Bosaaso, discussion of her children’s use 
of messaging platforms (such as WhatsApp) prompted her to recount her daugh-
ter’s experience of undocumented migration (tahriib) to Europe. The young woman 
was detained in Libya by human traffickers who contacted her mother (Murayo) in 
Bosaaso by phone. Her daughter described the violent abuse she was suffering and the 
traffickers’ demand for thousands of dollars to secure her release and onward travel 
to Europe. Murayo pleaded her poverty and was able to negotiate the sum down to 
$2600, which she then raised through family and social networks in Bosaaso. The 
money was sent to an intermediary in Mogadishu and then a smuggler in Sudan. 
These contacts were afforded by international mobile phone connections, and this 
may also include the transmission of images or video. In this case, Murayo reported 
that her daughter had reached Europe, first Italy and later Holland, but that she had 
struggled to find work and did not regularly remit money. Therefore, Murayo had not 
been able to pay back most of the debt she owed.
Other international links and resources manifest in displaced people’s digitally 
mediated engagements with humanitarian organisations. Although some interviewees 
had received SIM cards or phones from humanitarian organisations on which to receive 
mobile-cash support, they did not speak in detail about their experiences of using these 
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systems. Instead, they often complained that transfers occurred only once or were irreg-
ular. Digital cash transfers are often seen as being more discrete for recipients, giving 
greater potential control over spending (Sossouvi 2013). As noted above, the manage-
ment of urban camps for displaced people is undertaken by gatekeepers who are often 
affiliated with owners of the camp land. Some interviewed gatekeepers were quite can-
did about the share of aid they received from camp residents following distributions. We 
discuss elsewhere ambivalence towards gatekeeping practices and the patron–client rela-
tions in which they are embedded. Displaced people often weigh up the tangible support 
they received from gatekeepers against their obligations to pay a share of any external 
assistance received (Bakonyi et al. 2019; Bakonyi 2021). Mobile money doesn’t protect 
recipients from these obligations as gatekeepers are aware of the timing and scope of 
distributions and those registered (fieldnotes, Mogadishu, July 2018).
The relationships between camp leaders, humanitarian organisations and telecom-
munications companies also raise questions about the data being generated and stored 
through beneficiary registrations. Somalia currently lacks any data protection laws 
(Haji 2019) and data is collected by both humanitarian organisations and telecommu-
nication companies without oversight. The collection and utilisation of humanitarian 
(meta) data and the risks this involves has only been recently discussed by humanitar-
ian actors (Privacy International/ICRC 2018). In Somalia—a country lacking regu-
latory oversight and characterised by violent conflict and international military and 
civil engagement—the risks of data misuse are particularly acute. Some of these dan-
gers relate to surveillance, either from foreign or national intelligence agencies or from 
Al Shabaab. The latter maintains its military campaign against governmental insti-
tutions/representatives and their international backers. Al Shabaab operates parallel 
governance institutions and uses mobile telephony to request and collect parallel tax 
from businesspeople in cities, using it to threaten its opponents. Its occasional closure 
of mobile internet and its suspicion towards the use of smartphones is partly rooted 
in the awareness of the risks of data surveillance and the use of phones by spies to 
direct drone attacks against its members.
Conclusion
Mobile telephony has been adopted at rapid speed in Somalia and has inserted itself into 
and transformed everyday lives. Building on Appadurai, we conceptualise ‘precarious 
technoscapes’ to emphasise how the mobile connections of displaced people who settle at 
the precarious urban fringes remain part of quickly evolving global technological assem-
blages, but also highlight the unequal distribution and locally specific realisations of 
these global transnational flows. The speedy adoption of mobile telephony among some 
of the world’s poorest people has been accompanied by assumptions about ICTs’ equal-
ising and empowering effects. Our analysis contributes to a tempering of techno-optimist 
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discourses that, despite growing critique, continue to characterise humanitarian imagi-
naries. We have explored how displaced people settling at urban margins understand and 
experience the mobile boom, and how everyday movements, communications, transac-
tions and social relations are mediated through and shaped by ICTs.
Interviewees emphasised various benefits mobiles brought to their lives, focus-
ing on social networks and financial transfers. The phone facilitated mobility, and 
enabled access to information on available settlements and material aid. It allowed 
displaced people to stay in contact with relatives in Somalia and abroad, eased the 
search for jobs and facilitated the mobilisation of support. Above all, the telephone 
has developed into a ‘global banking tool’ (Easterling 2014: 121) and a partial alterna-
tive to formal banking and traditional forms of payment. The mobile phone became 
an important technology for network capital, the social relations that enable mobility 
and circulation (Urry 2007: 194–203).
The use of mobile phones and mobile money also brings risks for displaced peo-
ple. Beyond the dangers of robbery, people with lower levels of literacy were often 
unable to fully operate phones and had to rely on neighbours, family members or 
shop owners to access their accounts. They were often unable to ensure that employ-
ers had transferred payments and were vulnerable to deception. The possession of 
a mobile phone does not, in and of itself, empower people and neither does it auto-
matically minimise social exclusion. Instead, the use of the phone remains embedded 
in social relations and is shaped by power differentials, notably concerning economic 
constraints (which phone to buy, and how often to use it), differing levels of literacy, 
and social networks that can be mobilised for support. Although the mobile phone 
can be used to make and maintain these social connections, it does not by itself  gen-
erate access to relevant networks and does not ameliorate the power differentials 
that structure these networks. Engagement with the micro-sociology of ICT use can 
help to shed light on wider inequalities, in this case, the relation between margin-
alised urban populations and the commercial and humanitarian actors engaged in 
the reconstruction of Somali cities. Beyond the imaginary of frictionless flows and 
connectivity, people at precarious fringes of technoscapes continue to improvise and 
cobble together social relations and materials in their daily attempts to ensure their 
survival, while adapting to the new circulatory regimes and modalities of mobility 
that Appadurai (1996) has emphasised. Of emerging concern here is the rapid ‘data-
fication’ of humanitarianism and the unregulated generation and storage of data 
on vulnerable populations. Extreme power imbalances exist between recipients of 
humanitarian aid on the one hand, and humanitarian agencies and communications 
companies on the other. Further investigation is required on the implications of these 
digitally mediated entanglements. This requires a move beyond teleological assump-
tions of technology-facilitated development and a critical reflection on the risks that 
new forms of data generation entail concerning the protection of privacy, surveil-
lance, commercialisation and the governance of precarious populations.
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